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1. Introduction 
  Since 1970, various rural development projects, uch as the introduction and diffusion of 
high-yielding varieties of rice and land reform programs, have been implemented to address 
problems temming from rural poverty. These projects have caused rastic hanges in the 
socioeconomic structures ofrural areas (see Hayami and Kikuchi [6] and David and Otsuka 
[3]). 
  One of these changes i  the emergence of the custom known as sangla, which became 
common in the 1980s in progressive rice-farming areas of Inner Central Luzon and Panay.' 
Sangla is a land-pawning contract in which the pawner temporarily transfers his cultivation 
rights to the pawnee in return for a loan and can redeem these rights upon loan repayment. I  
is a characteristic feature of sangla that cultivation rights are not forfeited in the event of 
loan default. During the contract period, the returns from the land accruing to the pawnee, 
who assumes all operating expenses including land rent payments, represent implicit interest 
earned (paid) by the pawnee (pawner) 2 Sangla has been expected tofacilitate he mobilization 
of surplus funds in rural areas, while fears have also been expressed that land pawning will 
lead to a concentration f landownership and economic stratification (Nagarajan, David, and 
Meyer [10, p. 104]). 
  As to the background and the determinants of choosing sangla, Nagarajan, David, and 
Meyer [ 10] and Nagarajan, Quisumbing, and Otsuka [ 11 ] argue that (1) due to a severe 
contraction i  formal ending during the 1980s, land collateral was typically required in
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financial markets for long-term credit, (2) in the 1980s the declining profitability of rice 
farming due to decreasing real rice prices and increasing overseas employment opportunities 
induced ashift in investment patterns toward nonfarm employment and human capital, which 
in turn increased the demand for large amounts of long-term funds, (3) the increased demand 
for such loans could not be met by the formal financial institutions, because restriction on 
the transfer of beneficiary land titles limited the use of land as loan collateral, and (4) sangla 
became common in order for land reform beneficiaries to circumvent transfer restrictions on 
their cultivation rights to meet financial requirements.' 
  The above-mentioned views, however, have the following problems. First, we have 
observed that large-scale farmers do not necessarily end out their surplus funds to small-
scale farmers, thus refuting the prediction that land pawning accelerates stratification (see 
Umehara [17] as well). Concerning reasons (3) and (4), a number of counter examples were 
observed in our area of study. First, the effectiveness of land reform regulations under the 
Aquino and Ramos regimes i  questionable.' Second, in our area of study a number of OLH 
(Operation Leasehold) beneficiaries who were allowed to transfer their cultivation rights if . 
the landowners agreed, also borrowed money under sangla in addition to OLT (Operation 
Land Transfer) beneficiaries who were prohibited from mortgaging their land as loan 
collateral. This fact indicates that sangla is the more profitable measure for borrowing than 
the land-pawning contract stipulating that mortgaged land can be forfeited in the event of 
loan default.' 
 The objectives of this paper are (1) to elucidate the facts behind the emergence of sangla 
based on our field survey results and (2) to present an alternative hypothesis about he process 
of choosing sangla. Therefore, in the next section we show the actual situation of land 
pawning and the basic conditions under which sangla increased during the 1980s through a
comparison of five rice-growing villages with access to irrigation systems, their 
socioeconomic structures, and the frequency of choosing sangla. Based on these findings, 
Section 3 contains a comparative profitability analysis of two types of land pawning, in 
order to reexamine the implicit assumption i the research to date that the land-pawning 
contract in which mortgaged land will be forfeited in the event of default is more profitable 
than sangla. Then in Section 4, we present an alternative hypothesis on the determinants of 
choosing sangla nd offer empirical evidence to support the hypothesis, which explains the 
reason why small-scale farmers who are engaged in high-salaried off-farm jobs, prefer to 
lend their surplus funds to the large-scale farmers. Finally, we summarize the results of the 
investigation a d add concluding remarks on implications for policy reform.
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2. Overview of the Villages Studied and Land Pawning 
  We conducted our field survey during 1990-91. The villages urveyed are located in 
Nueva Ecija, Laguna, and Aklan provinces, which are all typical rice-growing regions in the 
Philippines. We sampled households at random and interviewed them for information on 
educational background and employment of family members, rice-growing practices, asset 
holdings, household income, revenues and expenditures in rice production, etc. 
  Favorability ofirrigation, average farm size, yield of rice, and tenurial status in the villages 
are shown in Table I. In villages Ba and Ca, which are located in Nueva Ecija Province, the 
land reform law (Presidential Degree 27) passed under the Marcos regime had been almost 
perfectly implemented. In Ba, since medium- and small-scale landowners had occupied 
land before the land reform law was enacted, OLH beneficiaries were predominant. On the 
other hand, in Ca, where the large-scale (more than 1,000 hectares) haciendas (plantation) 
had been dominant, OLT beneficiaries were predominant. Invillages Tu, Du, and Aq, since 
medium- and small-scale landowners had occupied the land, OLT beneficiaries were few. 
Tu is in Laguna Province and is a progressive rice-growing village where land reform was 
implemented primarily during the Marcos era. Consequently "illegal" share tenancy contracts 
with higher land rents are found only among relatives. Du and Aq are in Aklan Province, 
Panay. In Du, Marcos's land reform successfully ed to the decline of share tenancies and 
increase in fixed-rent leaseholds, while the implementation f land reform in Aq had not 
progressed, sothat most of the tenants had not yet sifted from share to fixed-rent leasehold 
tenancy. 
  In villages Ba and Tu, plentiful irrigation water drawn from the river and canals allowed 
farmers to cultivate rice crops twice a year. Ca is irrigated uring the rainy season, while 
irrigation is unfavorable for growing a rice crop during the dry season due to the lack of 
water resources. Vegetable cultivation isdone during the dry season using deep well irrigation. 
In Du, more than half of the farmers practice double cropping, while in drought prone rain-
fed Aq only a few farmers can grow two rice crops a year, Due to the environmental conditions 
of irrigation the rice yield is the highest in Ba and decreases in order from Ca, Tu, Du to Aq. 
 The average rice farm size is the largest in Ba. The next largest is found in Tu and Ca. 
Farm size in Du and Aq is the smallest, less than one hectare. Land pawning was mainly 
observed inBa and Ca, and little practiced inthe other villages. The reason why the percentage 
of pawned land is large in Ca, is not because the frequency of land-pawning contracts i  
higher in Ca, but because a large-scale farmer cultivates ten hectares of land acquired through 
sangla. From the above-mentioned findings, we discover that sangla is most frequently
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observed in Ba, where the average annual yield of rice and the average farm size were largest. 
 Next, from the characteristics ofsangla shown in Table II, we investigated the determinants 
of contractual choice regarding land pawning. In Ba, the profitability of rice farming was 
higher than the other villages, while the loan amount from pawning was smaller. 
Consequently, the implicit interest rate (around 50 per cent per one growing season) was 
higher than the prevailing market interest rate (30 per cent) in the region populated by 
professional moneylenders. This fact indicates that lenders preferred to loan through sangla. 
On the other hand, in Ca and Tu, where land pawning was also observed, the implicit 
interest rate for land-pawning contract was lower than the market interest rate. This means 
that lenders had less incentive to loan through sangla in these areas. 
  However, why do the borrowers prefer sangla? To consider this point, we estimated the 
implicit interest rate demanded from pawners (see Table III). This figure shows that the 
implicit interest rate was almost equal to the annual market rate. That is to say, it would not 
make any difference in terms of cost whether the borrowers obtained funds through sangla 
or from moneylenders, if the transaction cost and discount rate were negligible. 
 The tenurial status of pawned land in Ba and Ca contained in Table II shows that 82.6 per 
cent of land pawned through sangla was OLH land. This finding suggests that sangla was 
chosen because of its profitability, as mentioned in Section 1, regardless of land reform 
regulations. 
 These findings seem to show that Ba is full of the causes for choosing sangla; but this 
would be valid only on the assumptions that (1) loan default would not occur and (2) the 
present value of future income is equal to its future value. Therefore, in the next section, to 
consider the effectiveness of restriction imposed by land reform, we have made a comparative 
analysis of expected profits between sangla and the land-pawning contract in which loan 
default resulted in forfeiture of land cultivation rights, thus taking into account he possibility 
of default and a positive discount rate.
3. Sangla Versus Land-Pawning Contracts with Cultivation Rights Forfeiture 
Stipulations 
 In order to compare the profitability of these two types of land-pawning contracts, we use 
a simple two-period model so that the basic idea would not be lost. 
 First, we formulated the expected incomes of the pawnee, who employs his surplus funds 
to gain a livelihood through sangla and that of the pawner who borrows money via sangla to 
invest in nonagricultural enterprises. The two-period expected income of pawnee, V, is the 
sum of his income in the first period (agricultural income from cultivation of pawned land
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f(A) minus a loan L) and the discounted value of the income in the second period (total 
expected incomes after receiving L, which occurs with probability P, and after receiving 
AA), which occurs with probability (1 - P)),
(1)
Here, A indicates land area pawned, P indicates the probability of the pawner succeeding in 
his investment and repayment of the loan. Delta (S) indicates the discount factor. 
 Similarly, the expected income of the pawner W is
(2)
 Hence, A indicates land area owned by the pawner and g(•) indicates net profit function of 
land which differs from pawnee's f(A). Further, R indicates the profit from the investment if 
the pawner succeeds. We assume that profit is zero if the pawner fails. Gamma (y) indicates 
the discount factor of the pawner. 
 Next, we formulated the expected incomes of pawnee and pawner who conclude a land-
pawning contract stipulating forfeiture of land cultivation rights. In this case, we assume 
that the pawner who holds on to his cultivation rights in the first period repays the principal 
and interest in the second period, given he succeeds in his investment in the first period, 
while the pawnee takes over the mortgaged land if he does not.6 In addition, we assume that 
pawned land area A * is at the level at which the capital value of the net profit stream is equal 
to the debt of the pawner if the pawnee continues to cultivate the land indefinitely. That is to
say where r indicates the market interest rate.
The expected income of the pawnee
The expected income of the pawner is
(3) 
(4)
  Using these formulations, we compared expected incomes under the two contractual 
arrangements for pawnee and pawner respectively.
From equations (1) and (3),
From equations (2) and (4),
(5) 
(6)
 From equations (5) and (6), the sufficient condition for sangla is that the contract should 
not be less profitable for both of pawnee and pawner:
(7)
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 Based on information obtained through questionnaires, we investigated this condition to 
test the feasibility of sangla. 
 Table IV shows that pawnees consider that there is little possibility that pawners will fail 
to repay the loan. This finding indicates that the probability of repayment P in equation (6) 
is nearly equal to one. If this is the case, equation (7) may be reduced to
and
 The figures of implicit interest rates and market interest rates in Tables II and III indicate 
that this condition is satisfied on the average, if discount rates d and g tend to one. 
  The above argument holds only if both the pawnee and pawner abide by the contract. For 
example, in the case of sangla, a pawner may demand the return of his cultivation rights 
although he has not yet repaid loan, or a pawnee may refuse to receive the repayment and 
return cultivation rights although pawner is willing to repay loan before the term of payment. 
In these cases the argument does no necessarily hold. 
  Therefore, we need to investigate the actual ways in which contracts are observed in the 
area under study. Table IV shows that nearly 80 per cent of pawnees and pawners who 
concluded sangla contracts put them in writing and had them witnessed by such figure as 
village heads and chairmen of cooperatives. This fact indicates that it was very difficult for 
either side to default through a one-sided decision. In the case of oral contracts, most of 
them were made between relatives or close friends. Thus, the transaction cost for enforcement 
of the contracts seems to be negligible. We can conclude that the sufficient condition for 
choosing sangla was satisfied for the "average" farmer in Ba, where sangla was the most 
frequently observed, regardless of legal restrictions.
4. The Conceptual Model of Sangla 
  Based on the observed facts and information from previous research, we hypothesize 
about the causes of an increase in sangla contracts as follows. 
 The change in economic circumstances during the 1980s is an important precondition for 
the emergence of sangla. As mentioned in Section 1, the investment opportunities for 
nonagricultural ventures in such industries as transportation, trading, and overseas work 
increased in the 1980s. This change induced a shift in investment patterns toward nonfarm 
employment and human capital, which in turn increased demand for a large amounts of 
nonagricultural funds. On the other hand, as for the supply side of these funds, rural financial 
markets experienced strict credit rationing by severe contraction in formal lending due to the 
insolvency of many rural banks. As a result, for long-term credit land collateral was required
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in rural financial markets. It is a matter of course that if a borrower who held land cultivation 
rights mortgaged those rights, credit rationing could be mitigated because he could certainly 
settle his debt. But even if the borrower had creditworthiness, hecould not necessarily 
afford to obtain sufficient funds to meet his demand. The less the productivity and profitability 
of his land is, the more land he had to mortgage to raise these funds and the greater risk he 
had to take is having to transfer his cultivation rights to a larger part of his land. Therefore, 
only large-scale farmers could afford desired funds, given the large demand and low 
productivity and profitability of land cultivation. 
  However, farmers who succeeded in the green revolution and achieved higher productivity 
and profitability in rice farming could borrow the same amount of money in return for 
mortgaging less of their land cultivation rights. In turn, lenders were motivated to furnish 
them with more funds than before. The findings from Tables I and II that show profitability 
the highest and farm size the largest in village Ba where sangla was most frequently practiced, 
support this hypothetical view. 
  Next, we postulate a conceptual model for choosing the sangla contract from the viewpoint 
of rational behavior by both lender and borrower. First, we assume that here xists a number 
of farmers who expect hat nonagricultural investment opportunities are more profitable 
than rice cultivation, and, facing such profitable opportunities, rationally demand investment 
funds. On the other hand, there xist a number of wealthy families with surplus funds who 
expect that the cultivation of land acquired through sangla would be more profitable than 
investment i  nonagricultural ventures, taking into consideration the higher labor opportunity 
cost for off-farm work. 
  Here, we haveto explain why agriculture is more profitable than nonagricultural business 
for the lenders, not for the borrowers. Nagarajan, David, and Meyer [10, pp. 99-101] argue 
that his kind of asymmetry is caused by differences ofprofitability inrice cultivation between 
the pawnee and pawner due to differences in land quality and farm scale. However, anumber 
of facts do not fit their view. 
 First, differences inprofitability cannot be caused by the differences insoil condition and 
irrigation because both pawnees and pawners cultivate the same land; and the farm scale 
could not be a determinant for the difference, because the average farm size of pawner is 
larger than that of the pawnee in our area of study (see Table III). Therefore, we can conclude 
that differences inland quality and farm scale do not cause differences inthe profitability of 
rice cultivation. 
 More fundamentally, our findings do not support the hypothesis that he profitability in 
land cultivation of pawnees i  higher than that in nonagricultural business ventures. The
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actual profitability overseas work, the transportation business, and trading was higher than 
rice farming in our area of study. A better explanation is that the pawnees prefer to acquire 
cultivation rights through sangla because it is more remunerative over a change to off-farm 
work, which would incur high labor opportunity costs.' 
  From these consideration, we can offer a hypothesis that sangla would be chosen when 
desires of smaller-scale but wealthier farmer for higher household incomes by efficient 
employment of their surplus funds matches the motivation of larger-scale but less wealthy 
farmers to invest in more profitable nonagricultural ventures with funds borrowed through 
sangla.
5. Empirical Analysis 
 In this section, we first assume that the sangla contract will be chosen if the funds available 
to the lender are not smaller than the borrower's demand for them under the contractual 
terms offered. On this assumption, we will clarify via empirical evidence the determinants 
of sangla using a probit-type qualitative response model. The model may be formulated as 
follows. 
 We assume that the pawnee will agree to lend if his planned supply of funds is not smaller 
than the loan demanded by the pawner, taking into account he profitability of mortgaged 
land, the amount of surplus funds, etc. Otherwise the pawnee will refuse the pawner's offer. 
This indicates that if loan supply S is not smaller than loan demand D made by the pawner 
(regarded as constant by the pawnee), the pawnee will decide to supply the funds. We 
expect hat household income D, which depends on (1) human capital represented by education 
and number of family labor, (2) the profitability of the loan represented by implicit interest 
rate, (3) the amount of family assets, and (4) employment of permanent labor will all have 
positive effects on the choice of sangla, while farm size of the pawnee will have a negative 
effect on it. 
 Basedon such a consideration, we present a following empirical model.
If y = S - D > 0, y* = 1; otherwise, y* = 0.
S - D = 0 + al (family labor) + a2(education level [years of schooling] of household 
      head) + a3(implicit interest rate) + a4ln (family asset) + a5(permanent labor 
      dummy) + a6(farm size).
 Here, the permanent labor dummy variable is equal to one, if a farmer uses permanent 
labor; otherwise, it equals zero. The Ws are parametric. 
 On the other hand, we assume that pawner will request he loan and the other contract 
terms if his demand is positive; otherwise, he will not. Here, we expect hat (1) household
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income represented by human capital, (2) the profitability of the loan, and (3) the amount of 
family assets (agricultural fixed capital) will have negative effects on the choice of sangla, 
while farm size of the pawner will have a positive effect on it. 
 From this, we may formulate the following empirical model.
 Here, an OLT dummy variable is introduced to test the hypothesis in previous studies that 
OLT beneficiaries tend to acquire loans through sangla in order to escape the regulations 
under land reform laws. If the pawner is an OLT beneficiary, the OLT dummy variable is 
equal to one; otherwise, it is equal to zero. 
 The results of our estimation are presented in Tables V and VI. All the explanatory 
variables for the choices of pawnees are significant and the signs are what we expected. The 
variables for employment of permanent labor, implicit interest rate, education level of 
household head, and the number of family labors are significantly positive, while the farm 
size variable is significantly negative. The explanatory variables for pawner's choice of 
sangla - education level of household head, implicit interest rate, and agricultural fixed 
capital - are significantly negative, while the farm size variable is significantly positive. 
However, the other variables are insignificant, although their signs are nearly as we expected. 
It is worthy of special mention that the insignificance of the OLT dummy variable supports 
our hypothesis that land reform laws are not restrictive.
6. Summary and Conclusions 
  We can summarize the results of our investigation as follows. (1) Sangla contracts became 
more common in regions where increases inrice yields had been achieved and high-salaried 
job opportunities had increased. (2) The typical money stream does not flow toward small-
scale farmers from large-scale farmers. Rather, itwas very common i  our area of study that 
small-scale farmers engaged in high-salaried off-farm jobs lent our their surplus funds to 
large-scale farmers. (3) Sangla contracts were chosen by income-maximizing farmers, on 
the basis of rationality irrespective ofreform law restrictions. From these results we can 
draw the following implications for the debates mentioned inSection 1. 
  First, the results of our analyses allay fears that land pawning will lead to a concentration 
of landownership and social stratification. The fact that he duration of temporary transfer 
of cultivation rights is short, as shown in Table III, also supports this implication. Second,
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the same results also deny the view that sangla contracts have been chosen partly because 
land reform law prohibits land mortgaging by OLT beneficiaries. The legal regulations are 
not as restrictive as assumed in such a view. Finally, if our fact-finding is matched by 
surveys of other egions, we can conclude that sangla is a rational institution which promotes 
mobilization of unused investment funds in rural areas and is an institutional innovation 
devised by farmers themselves toadapt o changing economic circumstances. 
 Presently, the Philippine government has been implementing rural financial projects through 
multipurpose village cooperatives and the Land Bank to promote growth of cheap 
noninstitutional credit (see Llanto [8]), but our observation that only a few cases were 
successful in 1994 suggests hat hese projects are yet unsatisfactory. 
 The government should rather put priority on reforming the legislative system to improve 
rural informal credit markets and promote and foster indigenous institutional innovations 
like sangla rather than try to supply cheap credit o farmers through various institutional 
outlets aiming at mitigating credit rationing. This is because the effectiveness of a supply-
led approach in which government takes the initiative has been questionable, aspointed out 
in the conventional research. The time is ripe for the government todecide to carry out 
financial policy reforms in the direction we have recommended.
Note 
' Concerning the emergence ofsangla, see Hayami, Quisumbing, and Adriano [7], Umehara [17], 
 and Nishimura [12]. Concerning its origin (a Tagalog word meaning pawn or mortgage), see 
 McLennan [9]. 
2 The importance of land pawning in lending practices in developing countries uch as Bangladesh, 
 Indonesia, an Thailand is reported in Ghate [5], Wijaya and Sturgess [18], and Siamwalla et al. 
 [151. 
3 Nagarajan, David, and Meyer [10, p. 95]. Concerning reason (4), also see Nagarajan, Quisumbing, 
 and Otsuka [11]. 
a For the effectiveness of agrarian land reform law in the Philippines, see Nozawa [13]. In addition, 
 judging from the results of our field survey and the other esearch, we cannot ell that the land 
 reform regulations on mortgaging LOT (Operation Land Transfer) land are restrictive during recent 
 years, although under Marcos-era l nd reform law, large haciendas were broken up and land rents 
 drastically reduced. 
s See Hayami, Quisumbing, and Adriano [7] for a more detailed escription of the OLH and OLT 
 programs. 
6 It is implicitly assumed inthe conventional economic analysis of collateral that he collateral will be 
 forfeited in the event of default. See Benjamin [1], Stiglitz and Weiss [16], Plaut [14], Chan and
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Thakor [2]. 
' Evidence on this point is shown in Fukui [4].
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Table I
Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Sample Households in Five Villages, 1990 - 91
Item
Village
Ba Ca Tu Du Aq
No. of households 
Area irrigated (%) 









 Owner cultivator 
 Pawning 
 Others
  136 
  100 
     2.45 
  108 








   62 
   64 
     1.39 
   86








  41 
  98 
     2.24 
   80








  56 
  66 
     0.83 
  75 








   40 
   21 
     0.72 
   40









Description of the Pawning Contracts in F ive Villages, 1990 - 91
Item
Village
Ba Ca Tu Du A
No. of farm households (a) 
NO. of pawning (in) households (b) 
b/a (%) 
No. of pawning contracts 
Pawned land by tenure (%, area): 
 OLT 
 OLH 
Profit from rice farming (peso/ha/crop) 
Implicit interest rate (%/year) 
Loan size of pawning by tenure (peso/ha) 
 OLT 
 OLH 
Loan size (peso/household): 
 Total (c) 
 Pawning(d) 
 d/c (%) 





   17.4 
   82.6 
14,748.6 











  20.0 







   92.6 
     7.4 
10,048.0 







































Family labor (person) 
Permanent labor (use = 1; not use = 0) 
Pawned area (ha) 
Pawning contract (peso)
Implicit interest rate (%/year) 
Non-rice income (peso/household) 
Profit from rice farming (peso/ha/crop)a 
School year of household head 
Family asset (peso) 
Agricultural fixed capital (peso/ha)b 
Farm size (ha) 
CLT (certificate of land transfer) holder
Duration of land pawning (y






    2.227 
6 
     1.317 
49,340.8 
(37,464.5/ha) 
    60.7 
67,559.9 
14,088.9 
    6.636 
11,817.2 
   30.277 
    2.533 






    2.400 
   19 
    1.613 
52,905.7 
(32,799.6/ha) 
   101.5 
149,826.2 
15,986.0 
    11.229 
66,238.7 
  150.456 













    7.158 
24,788.8 
   87.203 
    2.346 
  22
a Annual gross revenue from rice production minus total sum of fixed capital cost, variable capital cost, 
 labor cost, and land rent. Fixed capital cost = the sum of flow costs of tractor, thresher, pump, and draft 
 animal; variable capital cost = total costs of chemical inputs and seeds; labor cost = the sum of labor 
 costs, including the all payments for hired laborers and imputed family labor costs; and land rent = the 
 imputed land rent in case of owned land, and the actual land rent in case of rented land. 
b Owned tractor, thresher, and pump per planted area.
Table IV
Information Obrained through a Questionaire on Land Pawning in Village Ba
Question
Yes No
Pawner Pawnee Pawner Pawnee
Total
1. Would you prefer sangla to a 
  collateral contract in which the 
  borrower agrees to forfeit in the 
  event of land default?
2. Did you have your sangla contract 
  wintessed to?
3. Do you see the possibility of your 












Estimation of Sample Selection Model for Pawning in Village Ba
Variable
Probit Dependent Variable 




Education level of household head 
Implicit interest rate 
Family asset 
Permanent labor dummy 
Farm size
Log of likelihood function 
No. of observations 
No. of positive observations 
% of positive observations
*
**
indicates significance at 5 per cent level. 





















Estimation of Sample Selection M
Constant 
Family labor 
Education level of household head 
Implicit interest rate 
Agricultural fixed capital 
Farm size 
OLT dummy
Log of likelihood function 
No. of observations 
No. of positive observations 
% of positive observations
odel for Pawning in Vill age Ba
Probit Dependent Variable 























indicates significance at 5 per cent level. 
indicates significance at 1 per cent level.
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